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AID TO EDUCATION - STATE STYLEt
LEONARD F. M4,NIYNG*
The scholar-incentive plan-what is it? is it constitutional? Professor
Manning traces the policy background of Governor Rockefller's program,
for higher education and considers the objections raised by critics under the
New York State Constitution. From an examination of the legislative policy
regarding the role of private institutions in the higher educational system
of the state and of the constitutional cases, he argues that the strict
prohibitions of the state charter are inapplicable in the area of higher
education.
WE ARE told, in Article I, Section 3, of the New York State Constitu-
tion, that "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be al-
lowed in this state to all mankind.... "The various sections contained in
Article I of the New York State Constitution are under the general head-
ing, "Bill of Rights."
Section 8 of Article VII of the New York State Constitution reads, in
its pertinent part:
The money of the state shall not be given or loaned to or in aid of any private
corporation or association, or private undertaking; nor shall the credit of the state
be given or loaned to or in aid of any individual, or public or private corporation
or association, or private undertaking, but the foregoing provisions shall not apply
to any fund or property now held or which may hereafter be held by the state for
educational purposes.
Section 8 appears among those sections of the state constitution which
are grouped under the article heading, "State Finances."
Section 1 of Article XI reads: "The legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein
all the children of this state may be educated."
Section 4 of Article XI reads:
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use its property or credit or any
public money, or authorize or permit either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid
or maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any school or institution
of learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious denom-
ination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught, but the legis-
lature may provide for the transportation of children to and from any school or
institution of learning.
'I See introductory note to companion article, Aid to Education-Federal Fashlon,
p. 495 supra.
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
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Article XI is entitled "Education." Section 2 of Article XI simply con-
tinues recognition of the "Regents of the University of the State of New
York," and Section 3 of the same article relates to the depositing and
application of school funds. Neither Section 2 nor Section 3 has any par-
ticular relevancy to the problem under consideration.'
THE SCHOLAR-INCENTIVE PLAN
On December 21, 1959, Governor Rockefeller appointed Henry T.
Heald, Marion B. Folsom and John W. Gardner as a "Committee on
Higher Education"'
to review the higher education needs and facilities in New York State and to make
recommendations on the steps that the State could take to:
(1) assure educational opportunities to those qualified for college study;
(2) provide the undergraduate, graduate and professional training and research
facilities necessary for the continued development of the State as a leading
business, industrial, scientific and cultural center; and
(3) contribute its proper share of trained personnel to meet the nation's needs for
education, health and welfare services.
3
After a study in which the Committee had the assistance of over ninety
leading educators in the United States (none of whom, incidentally, was
on the staff of or connected with any church-related college or univer-
sity),' and which lasted almost a year, the Committee submitted its
report to the Governor and the Board of Regents.5 The Committee pre-
1. For convenience's sake, Section 3 of Article I shall hereinafter be called simply
Section 3. Section 8 of Article VII shall be referred to as simply Section 8 and Sections
1 and 4 of Article XI shall be mentioned simply as Section 1 and Section 4, respectively.
2. Dr. Heald having been designated as chairman by the Governor, the committee
was commonly called the Heald Committee and the report subsequently submitted Is more
often referred to as the Heald Report.
3. Letter of Transmittal, in Committee on Higher Education, Meeting the Increasing
Demand for Higher Education in New York State: A Report to the Governor and the
Board of Regents (1960).
4. See list of consultants, id. at 71-74.
5. "The Board of Regents is responsible for the most comprehensive job of educational
administration in the United States. In addition to its responsibilities in the field of
higher education it supervises the elementary and secondary school education of 2,800,000
children in five thousand public schools; supervises all the museums, libraries, organiza-
tions and agencies for education officially recognized by the State; registers foreign and
domestic educational institutions in terms of New York standards, and fixes the value
of their diplomas and degrees; administers the licensing of eighteen professions; and is
responsible for the operation of the State's Unfair Educational Practices Act. In the
exercise of these responsibilities the State Education Department, including the Commis-
sioner of Education and his staff, has a host of administrative duties, many of them
mandated by law." Id. at 18.
Colleges and universities in New York are subject to visitation and inspection by the
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dicted that enrollments in colleges and universities in the State of New
York would more than triple by the year 19S5.0 It found that
Many private colleges and universities will be unable to finance a rapid expansion
at a time when faculty and other costs are rising sharply. Nearly all are operating
at substantial deficits which have to be covered each year by gifts from corporations.
alumni, and individual friends of the college. With present methods of op-,ration,
increased enrollments vill result in even greater deficits and an even greater need
for gifts. These gifts can be expanded, but not rapidly enough to permit large
increases in enrollments.7
The report emphasized that "the bulwark of higher education in New
York State for many years has been our private colleges and universities,
and the great tradition of meeting the need for higher education through
a combination of private and public institutions must be preserved for
the future."" On the same subject it added:
Private institutions of higher learning have important and unique functions to
perform. They give American education a diversity and scope not possible in tax-
supported institutions alone, and they have an opportunity to emphasize, if they
wish, individualistic patterns of thought, courses of social action, or political or
religious activity. In New York State, private colleges and universities have per-
formed this function vith great competency in the pastY
It "proposed" that the state inaugurate a program of direct aid to
private colleges and universities and "suggested" that this aid take the
form of a "per capita grant to each institution for each student graduated
with a degree approved by the Board of Regents. 10
Mindful of potential constitutional implications in its recommenda-
tions, the Committee added a cautionary paragraph:
We are advised that a contract plan would not violate the State Constitution wvhere
nonsectarian colleges and universities are concerned. We are not in a position, how-
ever, to say how sectarian institutions might fit into this State-aid program. The
issue has never been decided specifically by the courts and we are informed that
views as to its potential constitutionality are speculative.1
Thus the Heald Committee felt concern for the financial plight of the
private college and private university. But it is apparent that the Com-
Board of Regents. The Board sets the standards for all dogres, undergraduate, graduate
and professional, for all colleges and universities, both public and private, in New York
State.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id. at 4-6.
5. Id. at 24.
9. Ibid.
10. Id. at 24-25.
11. Id. at 25.
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mittee sifted only part of the first part of the Governor's commission "to
assure educational opportunities to those qualified for college study. ' 1 2
What of the financial plight of the student? Surely that poses a problem
equally as grave. The Committee gave no figures regarding the mounting
increase, almost a multiplication, in tuition charges at private colleges in
recent years. It did have, however, a three-fold recommendation for
student assistance. It proposed13 to increase the number of state scholar-
ships from five per cent to ten per cent of each year's high school gradu-
ating class,1" to increase the maximum scholarship awards to $1,500,
with the "honorary" minimum amount fixed at $100 and the higher
amounts dependent upon the financial needs of the recipient, and to
reduce the cost of loans to students through the program of the New
York Higher Education Assistance Corporation.1"
Whatever reservations the Committee may have had regarding the
constitutionality of direct subsidies for private church-related colleges
were quite obviously dissipated in the case of the Regents scholarships
and in the case of the student loan program. There was no caveat re-
garding the constitutionality of either, although both are available to
students choosing to attend sectarian colleges.
The Governor had no comment on the Heald Report. The Board of
Regents did.
In its legislative recommendations, made public on December 28, 1960,
the Board of Regents confirmed the Heald diagnosis of the need for state
aid to private colleges, but they were not ready to prescribe the Heald
12. Note 3 supra.
13. Committee on Higher Education, op. cit. supra note 3, at 45.
14. The scholarship aid here referred to is "Regents Scholarships." The New York
State Regents Scholarship program, established in 1913, provides college and university
tuition assistance each year to 59% of the high school graduating class, taking into account
both public and private high schools. The scholarships are available only to New York
residents. The scholarship covers a maximum of four years of study at any accredited
college in the state. Each scholarship carries a stipend of $250 to $700 dependent on the
recipient's financial need as computed on the basis of a statutory need formula. N.Y. Educ.
Law § 601. Thus, wisdom is the price of the grant and the qualifying student, regardless
of pelf or penury, is entitled to the minimum stipend of $250 per year.
15. The Higher Education Assistance Corporation was created by the New York Legis-
lature in 1957 as a nonprofit, public corporation to assist students, who are residents
of New York, attending colleges either in New York or outside of New York, by lending
or guaranteeing the loan of funds to help them meet their college expenses. The maximum
loan for any school year is $1000 and the over-all maximum is $5000. The interest rates
and terms of repayment are fixed by the corporation's board of directors. N.Y. Educ.
Law § 653. The corporation has adopted the policy of guaranteeing bank loans to students
rather than making such loans itself. Current loans are at an interest of 4% per annum.
[Vol. 29
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formula for furnishing support. The Regents cited with favor an alterna-
five measure, a plan proposed by the Association of Private Colleges and
Universities of the State of New York. The latter, a private organization,
sought tuition supplements for full-time resident students attending pri-
vate colleges in New York-a proposal "somewhat like the G.I. Bill"
which, it was noted, would permit the colleges to increase tuition in pro-
portion to the student grants.'" Quite obviously the Regents, too, were
thinking more in terms of college-assistance and less in terms of student-
assistance.
Finally, on January 31, 1961, the Governor sent a special message to
the Legislature entitled "Increased Opportunities for Higher Educa-
tion."' 7 The Governor made it palpably plain that he was concerned as
much for the increased burden which the increased cost of higher educa-
tion had imposed upon the student as he was for the expansion of facili-
ties for higher education. In dealing with the latter the Governor made
no mention of private colleges and universities, no mention of private
higher education. It would appear that, by his silence, the Governor was,
with polite and political prudence, rejecting both the Heald proposals and
the Regents recommendations respecting public aid for private colleges.
The Governor spoke of a "clear necessity for the higher education of all
who have the ability and ambition to achieve it" and he noted that higher
education "imposes rising burdens of expense upon the family and great
responsibilities upon our colleges and universities.'"" His was a dual
approach--"We need to approach this problem along two principal lines:
First, greater financial assistance to help the student and his family meet
the rising costs of higher education and, second, the expansion of facili-
ties."'" Then, under the heavy-captioned heading, "Student Aid," he set
out the core of his scholar-incentive program:
I recommend the establishment of a "New York State Scholar Incentive Pro-
gram", to provide each full-time, tuition-paying student attending an undergraduate
college in the State, who is also a resident of the State and who makes application,
with an annual grant up to $200 to help him pay his tuition in excess of $500
annually.
In addition, for graduate study, I recommend that to each full-time, tuition-
paying student who is a resident of the State and is enrolled in an approved graduate
program leading to an advanced degree, a similar grant up to $400 be paid for stu-
dents to the masters degree level; and for students in graduate wor: above the
masters degree level, I recommend a grant up to $soo per year.*-O
16. N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Dec. 29, 1960, p. 1, col. 3.
17. N.Y. Legislative Doc. No. 9 (1961).
13. Id. at 5.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Id. at 7.
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The Governor recommended that the grant should be payable to a
student enrolled in a public institution as well as to a student in a private
institution, wherever the tuition at the institution was in excess of $500.
While he attached the label, scholar-incentive, to his proposal, the Gov-
ernor was speaking-taking the words in their acquired rather than their
root meaning-of students. He spoke of financial assistance to students
who, though displaying no significant scholarship, were nonetheless en-
titled, in the Governor's opinion, to a chance at a college education at the
college of their choice." The Governor did not ignore the more talented.
For those whose scholastic achievement was worthy of note he suggested
an increase in Regents scholarships from five per cent of the high school
graduating class to ten per cent of the graduating class.2
Neither of these recommendations contemplated financial assistance to
the colleges themselves. The matter of assistance to the colleges was con-
sidered in the second half of the Governor's message. And there his only
recommendation related to the enlargement of public college facilities. '
21. To provide further assistance to students generally the Governor also advocated
an expansion of the student loan program through the adoption of new measures to reduce
the cost of such loans. Id. at 10.
22. Id. at 9.
23. In the way of institutional aid the Governor recommended expansion of the State
University to provide for two comprehensive graduate centers and the broadening of
facilities at the state colleges of education, including provisions for 324 new faculty posi-
tions and eight new science buildings; the enlargement of the state's two-year colleges;
the preparation of a master plan for the expansion and improvement of the munici-
pal colleges within the City of New York, and, generally, the improvement of educa-
tional techniques, college and university management and the utilization of facilities.
Id. at 12-16.
The Governor also recommended an expansion of the powers of the Dormitory Authority.
The Dormitory Authority was created in 1944 to finance the building of dormitories at
public colleges. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 1675-90. In 1955 and again in 1959 the Dormitory
Authority Act was amended to permit the Authority to act as a medium for financing
construction at private colleges and universities and to extend the act's provisions to
include the financing of the construction of any academic building. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law
§§ 1676, 1680. The Governor proposed legislation to implement a proposed constitutional
amendment increasing the Authority's borrowing power and further recommended that,
since the Authority is already empowered to guarantee the financing of college buildings
other than dormitories, the name be changed to the New York State College Building
Authority. Since there is here a use of "state credit," there is presented a problem
under Article XI, Section 4 of the New York State Constitution, considered infra p. 539
passim. Oddly enough, there has never been any criticism of this part of the Governor's pro-
posais. It would seem that those who object to the Governor's scholar-incentive plan
on the principle of "separation of church and state" are not perturbed by a principle,
other than the principle of providing too much.
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For the private colleges the Governor offered, literally, nothing but
praise."
There were critics of the Governor's plan, some modulated, some
vituperative.
The moderate segment of the criticism was aimed at the absence of a
"means test" and a "merit test" in the scholar-incentive plan. Most of
the critics were pacified when, on February 20, 1961, the Governor
amended the proposal to include both a means and a merit test.2 This
final proposal-the only one under legislative consideration"' and the only
one in issue now-is stitched somewhat on the pattern of the Regents
scholarships.
The means test is bottomed on the "net taxable income" of student
and parents. It creates three categories. In the first are those whose net
taxable income is less than $1800 per year, in the second those whose net
taxable income falls between $1800 and $7500, and in the third, those
whose net taxable income exceeds $7500 per year. Students in the first
category will receive a grant of $300 toward college tuition, those in the
second category $200 and those in the last category $100. University
students pursuing graduate studies will, if in the first category, receive
$400 for the first two semesters and $S00 for each two subsequent
semesters; those in the second category, corresponding awards of $300
and $600; and those in the last category, corresponding awards of $200
and $400.7
24. The Governor did propose the limited assistance set out in note 23 supra.
25. E.g., the New York Board of Rabbis said that the "merit test, the means test
and the awarding of the scholarship directly to students on the higher school level rcmove
this legislation from the area of church-state conflict." The Board had objected to the
original proposal on the ground that it might be used to provide funds for -2ctarian
colleges. N.A. Times, March 2, 1961, p. IS, coL S. The Nev. York State Cuuncil of
Churches, in the forefront of the critics of the original plan, vAthdrew its oppuftion
to the revised plan, stating that it considered the revised bill a "sinccre and successful"
attempt to avoid any conflict wth constitutional barriers. N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Feb. 23,
1961, p. 17, col 4.
The "means" and "merit" tests serve only to individualize the grants. Hrw the aia.x:nce
of either bears upon the "church-state" issue is a matter of conjecture.
26. N.Y. Assembly No. 4169 (1961); N.Y. Senate No. 2937 (1961). The bills are
identical, hence future references will be limited to the Assembly number.
27. N.Y. Assembly No. 4169, § 4 (1961). All grants are to aid students only to the
extent that their tuition exceeds $200. The tuition-charge base, thus lowered from $50
in the Governor's original plan, makes state aid available to students in public cclIgces
where tuition exceeds $200 per year. There are 14,000 such public college students in New
York State. Only 876 students at public medical schools in New York State pay tuition
in excess of $500 per year.
The entire program, detailed in N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Feb. 21, 1961, p. 1, col. 1, and
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The merit test would appear to be a formality. It simply provides that
the Board of Regents must certify that prior to enrollment the student
applying for the stipend showed promise of completing successfully a
college degree program of either two or four years' duration. -8
I have set forth in detail the foregoing sequence of events and, in some
instances, the specifics of the various proposals, because the sequence
itself and the various proposals and counterproposals have a direct bear-
ing upon the principal argument heretofore directed at the constitutional-
ity of the scholar-incentive plan.
CRITICS OF THE SCHOLARSHIP-INCENTIVE PLAN
No one, or hardly anyone, has been critical of the scholar-incentive
plan because it provides aid to private nonsectarian colleges. The battle
line has been drawn against church-related colleges. The crossfire has
come from those who would man the parapets of the "wall of separation"
between church and state. In brief, the fusillade is aimed not at aid
to education per se, not at aid to private education, but at the inclusion
within the area of private education of the education provided by church-
related colleges. The argument, stripped to its essentials and put in its
simplest terms, is that the state can do nothing which will in any way or
in any measure redound to the benefit of a church-related college or
university.
It has, therefore, been said that the scholar-incentive plan is "sub-
vention by subterfuge, '129 that the plan is an arcane attempt to provide
assistance to church-related schools under the artificial flower of aid to
the student. A second argument"0 accepts the assumption of the first and
reasons that this subterfuge, already assumed, is as constitutionally un-
sound as the pretextured plans adopted in certain Southern areas to
avoid the integration edict of the United States Supreme Court.
Both of these arguments3 ' have the built-in assumption that state aid to
N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1961, p. I, col. 8, remains limited to New York residents attending
New York colleges and universities.
The Governor's revised program also recommended an increase of Regents scholarships
from a percentage (5% of the high school graduating class, which percentage provided
7,911 scholarships last year) to a flat 17,000 (which will amount to approximately 10%
of the June 1961 high school graduating class). N.Y. Assembly No. 4169, § 3 (1961).
28. N.Y. Assembly No. 4169, § 4 (1961).
29. Editorial, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1961, p. 1, col. 7.
30. See Letter of Professors Walter Gellhorn, Horace M. Kallen and Edmond Calm,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1961, p. 22, col. 5.
31. Other arguments against the scholar-incentive plan had a sort of mixed appeal
and a mixed-up logic. There were those who, conceding the validity of the Regents
scholarship program, nonetheless opposed the scholar-incentive plan as a subsidy of
[Vol. 29
AID TO EDUCATION--STATE STYLE
church-related colleges-howsoever achieved-is unconstitutional. That
such aid is not, under all circumstances, unconstitutional is the burden
of this article. That such aid is not unconstitutional is, indeed, the very
heart of the matter and, therefore, the end of the affair. It is, in other
words, boot-strap logic to begin with an assumption of unconstitution-
ality. I do not understand why this type of aid, if aid it be, is uncon-
stitutional. Nor do I comprehend why the scholar-incentive plan is an
aid to church-related colleges in the first place or why it is said to have
been secretly so intended. It is rather a serious matter to impute to the
Governor of a sovereign state a scheme of "subvention by subterfuge,"
but, that aside, it would appear that the Governor said in unambiguous
terms that he was interested in student-aid as well as college-aid. The
Governor's message spelled out his program for institutional aid as a
program of aid for public colleges alone. State aid for private colleges
was the theme of the Heald Report. But the Governor politely rejected
this aspect of the Heald Report and, in fact, Dr. Heald just as politely
objected to the scholar-incentive plan precisely because it did not provide
the necessary assistance to private schools of higher educationa2
church-related colleges. See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 29. The Regnts grant eventually
reaches the church-related colleges as does the scholar-incentive stipend-the former
through scholars, the latter through students. The principle is the same. If the Regents
scholarship program is constitutional, the scholar-incentive plan is likewie constitutional.
The objection, if one is prepared to accept the Regents scholarship plan, is miplacecd
when placed on constitutional grounds. For the objection is really not dircted at the
ultimate terminus of the funds but at the form of the conveyance. Those who approve
the Regents scholarship program but reject the scholar-incentive plan are really faying
that the state can aid the gifted, but it cannot aid the needy-a propozition wvhich, I
am certain, no one would espouse.
There were those who would distinguish the G.I. educational bill from the scholar-
incentive plan on the theory that the G.I. bill represented a form of contract compen-
sation for services rendered. See, e.g., Gellhorn, Kallen & Cahn, supra note 30. In the
case of military service no contract known to law is contemplated. It i3 somewhat naive
to label the G.I. bill legal consideration for services rendered. The G.I. bill was a gift,
an outright gift from Congress. A citizen has a duty to defend his country in time of
war and for the performance of that duty he acquires no claim for compmnation against
his country. There is, therefore, no semblance of a contract between the Nation and its
citizen-soldiers.
32. N.Y. Herald-Tribune, March 2, 1961, p. 5, col. 5. Dr. Heald maid, "I consider
it unfortunate that in the clamor about church-related institutions and the opposition
of some people to spending any public funds in privately controlled college, the basic
objective of strengthening all of the state's higher educational system has been largely
lost." Dr. Heald noted that the scholar-incentive plan "calls for aid to student- for
payment of tuition. As such, it will be of assistance to many students and is worthy
of support on that basis." He added that "it is moral, just and practical" for private
colleges to receive state aid, and that the alternative could be an "intolerable" burden
on the taxpayer.
1961]
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Were we to suppose, in any event, that the Governor fashioned in his
scholar-incentive plan a funnel for the flow of financial assistance to the
colleges themselves, it is seriously to be questioned whether a court of
law could consider that assumption. A court certainly has no power to
psychoanalyze the executive or the legislature. Legislative motives are
immaterial. 3 Judicial concern would touch only the actual or objective
effect of the proposal.
In the case of the larger colleges and universities whose student bodies
are fairly well proportioned between students resident in New York and
those who are nonresident, it is, with a due sense of good judgment,
granted that it would not be feasible for college presidents to use the
grants as a measuring rod for commensurate tuition increases.14 It is sug-
gested, however, that the smaller colleges which attract predominantly
New York residents have available this flexible funnel for receiving state
assistance without disturbing the student's financial reserve. But the
argument ignores the fact that there are church-related colleges among
the so-called larger institutions of higher education" and that there are
nonsectarian colleges among the so-called smaller institutions of higher
education. 6  The argument is addressed actually against the smaller
colleges and it would appear to be misplaced when it is buttressed on
the inclusion of church-related colleges. Because all small colleges might
benefit is no reason to exclude all church-related colleges. This, it seems
to me, is equivalent to proposing the elimination of the fire department
because there is a temple or a church in the fire district.3"
33. "Of course we cannot suppose the Act to have been passed for sinister motives."
Holmes, J., in Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339 (1929).
34. When the scholar-incentive plan was first announced, the four New York schools
which responded to the question, Fordham (Catholic church-related), Syracuse (Methodist
church-related), New York University and Columbia, announced that they had no in-
tention of raising tuition to take advantage of the program. N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Feb. 1,
1961, p. 5, col. 1.
35. E.g., Syracuse (Methodist), St. John's (Catholic), Fordham (Catholic). The argu-
ment advanced also ignores the fact that certain church-related colleges draw out-of-
state students simply because they are church-related-e.g., Wagner (Lutheran), Yeshiva
(Jewish), Brandeis (Jewish), Marymount (Catholic)-and thus these colleges could not
introduce an automatic tuition increase without prejudicing their out-of-state students.
36. I would suppose that Adelphi, Webb, or Hofstra, for example, would be considered
smaller colleges.
37. There is also a tenuous inference drawn by the N.Y. Times to find in the scholar-
incentive plan a college-aid motive simply because the grants are limited to students
attending New York state colleges. It is argued that this limitation betrays a scheme
to funnel state funds to New York colleges. Editorial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1961, p. 30,
col. 2. But only New York colleges and universities are subject to visitation by the
Board of Regents. Their standards are fixed by the Board. It is well within the province
[Vol. 29
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On this somewhat implausible assumption of subterfuge there has
been erected the crude analogy to Brown v. Board of Educ. ' and to
the Supreme Court's condemnation of state schemes to escape the
effect of the Brown decision. It is said that the subterfuge here con-
ceived is no different from the subterfuge embodied in a student place-
ment project which has as its purpose the continuance of racial segre-
gation and no different from a state's replacement of its public school
system by a system of private, racially segregated education, that
just as these two artifices cannot operate to avoid the Court's order in
Brown, so also the scholar-incentive plan cannot employ the device
of student grants to avoid the constitutional proscription of institu-
tional grants. We have been reminded that the Court has said that
the Brown case cannot be "nullified indirectly .. . through evasive
schemes for segregation whether attempted 'ingeniously or ingenuosly.' "
The double analogy, thus advanced, would equate an assumed eva-
sion of the first amendment with an actual evasion of the fourteenth
amendment. A student-placement plan whose operative effect is to
promote racial segregation is quite a different thing from the scholar-
incentive plan, even a scholar-incentive plan with a built-in assump-
tion that it has been designed to aid church-related schools. There is
nothing unconstitutional per se in a student placement plan. It becomes
invalid only when it promotes racial segregation, and this it does only
because there is racial discrimination in the administration of the
plan."0 The attack upon the scholar-incentive plan is directed not
against any possible administrative irregularity but against the very
purpose of the plan itself.
The second half of the analogy is taken a limping step further with
the assumption that a state could not substitute a system of private
education to accomplish what Brown forbids. It may well be that
under those circumstances private education becomes public education
because it receives its lifeblood from the state, and it may well be
that racial segregation in a state-sustained private system would be
in contempt of the Brown injunction. But we spin speculation when
we assume that we must have a common school system,4 that a state
and the -isdom of the legislature to limit the grants to students attending col!eges
and universities automatically assured of qualifying under the standards fucd by the
State of New York.
38. 347 U.S. 433 (1954).
39. Cooper v. Aaron, 35 U.S. 1, 17 (1958).
40. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.),
aff'd, 358 U.S. 101 (195S).
41. There is a distant analogy here to Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1947),
1961]
536 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
could not under any circumstances disestablish its public school sys-
tem and substitute in its place grants to parents to enable them to
send their children to the schools of their choice. No court of law has
ever pronounced such an edict and, since the public school is not a crea-
ture of the U.S. Constitution, it is captious, indeed, to assume that one
could. And it is as prudent to note that whatever command the Court
may give to the states in the complex aftermath of Brown v. Board
of Educ., it need not give and cannot always give in the case of church-
related schools. For the simple fact is that the church-related school
is a school which the state has no power to abolish.4" Nor has it the
power to abolish the teaching of religious tenets.44 But a state has
the power to abolish a racially segregated school and not only the
power but the duty to abolish racial segregation within the school.
It is the right to attend the school of one's choice which the scholar-
incentive plan seeks to preserve. It is the exercise of this right which
certain critics of the scholar-incentive plan seek, I believe, to stigma-
tize and penalize. The program, it is to be noted, does not offer an
inducement to attend a church-related school. Nor does it seek pre-
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948), and Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949).
After the Supreme Court had held in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), that the
exclusion, by political parties, of Negroes from participation in state primary elections
violated the fifteenth amendment (which guarantees Negro suffrage) because the political
parties were actually performing state functions pursuant to state law under state pro-
vision and subject to statutory control, South Carolina repealed its statutes providing
for control of primary elections and transferred the conduct of primary elections to
"private" organizations, the political parties. The Rice and Baskin cases reasoned that
the political parties had become state institutions, governmental agencies through which
the sovereign power of the state was exercised, and that no election machinery could
be sustained if its effect was to deny Negro suffrage. Thus the courts identified the
conduct of a primary election, in and of itself, as a governmental act. Both Rice and
Baskin were expressly approved by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953). It would be rather difficult to classify the conduct of a private school as per se a
governmental act.
42. Mr. Justice Douglas, however, seems to have made this assumption in one of
his nonjudicial moments. See Two Faces of Federalism 58-60 (Hutchins ed. 1961). Mr.
Justice Douglas, with other distinguished scholars gathered together by the Center for
the Study of Democratic Institutions, took part in the freewheeling discussion which
followed the presentation of a formal paper by Dr. Robert M. Hutchins. Whatever merit
the Justice's casual comment may have, I wonder about the propriety of a Justice of
the Supreme Court engaging in a freewheeling discussion of issues which may very well
come before the Court. Compare the refusal of Mr. Justice Brennan, when his appoint-
ment to the Court was being considered by the Senate, to respond to certain questions
which he believed might come before the Court for determination. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27,
1957, p. 15, col. 4.
43. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
44. Such would be a quite obvious violation of the first amendment.
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ferment for Jew, Methodist or Catholic. A Catholic who elects to
attend New York Universityj or a Jew who chooses to attend Fordham
University receives the same treatment from the state as the Jew at
Yeshiva, the Catholic at Fordham, the Lutheran at Wagner, the Metho-
dist at Syracuse and the agnostic at Columbia. The essence of the
plan is equality. By its very nature there is an absence of preference.
But to deny state financial assistance to a student, whatever be his
creed, simply because he elects to attend a church-related school is
not only to prejudice the church-related school but to prejudice the
student himself in the exercise of a constitutionally recognized freedom.
Is the imposition of this penalty upon the student's freedom of choice
substantially any different than the penalty which an earlier Court dis-
countenanced in Wolf v. Colorado" and a later Court discountenanced
in Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ.? The former would forbid the
imposition of a penalty upon a citizen who exercised his right to refuse
admittance into his home to a state officer who sought entry without
a search warrant. A penalty cannot be imposed even though, said
the Court, the fourth amendment does not in its broad terms operate
to restrict state officers. The latter case held it improper to penalize
the alleged Communist simply because he had pleaded his fifth amend-
ment privilege against self incrimination.
To recognize the right of the studcnt is only to recognize what
the Governor proposed. The scholar-incentive plan-though we have
arguendo thus far assumed the contrary-has been offered, by executive
affirmation, not as a boon to the educational institutions themselves
but as a limited subsidy to students whom the state would encourage
to higher intellectual achievements at the colleges or universities of
their choice. And objection on constitutional grounds becomes vacuous,
indeed, when we recognize the plan for what it actually is.
We have travelled thus far down a corridor of assumption. The
critics of the Governor's proposal, in their arguments heretofore con-
sidered, have assumed that state aid to church-related colleges would
violate the New York State Constitution. I have assumed that state
aid to church-related colleges would not violate the United States Con-
stitution. I have assumed that there is no difference between college
45. It has been reported that New York Universiky has the argast Catholic rtudcnt
body (10,000) of any college in the United States. Fordham and St. John's, among
the larger Catholic colleges, have larger student bodies but, of course, not all students
are Catholic. N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Feb. 12, 1961, p. 23, col. 1.
46. 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 2c5 (19C);
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
47. 350 US. 551 (1956).
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education and elementary schooling. And I have assumed that the
issues presented are justiciable issues, capable of being raised in a
court of law by a resident taxpayer of the state of New York. Only
some of these assumptions are valid.
It is valid to conclude, by an a fortiori force of logic, that if govern-
ment aid to church-related elementary schools does not violate the
United States Constitution, certainly government aid to college students
cannot do so. We might recall that it was the Supreme Court which
distinguished Master Barnette's sin48 from Mr. Hamilton's sin," or rather
the penalties paid for their refusal to sin. But remembering Mrs. Fron-
thingham,5° it is not valid to assume here that a taxpayer would have
a standing to challenge the scholar-incentive plan in the courts of
New York. Thus, two essential issues remain: Does the scholar-incentive
plan violate the New York State Constitution? Does any taxpayer
have a standing, a sufficient interest, to challenge its validity?
THE TAXPAYER'S STANDING TO SUE
In Frothingham v. Mellon,"l the Supreme Court left it to the state
to decide whether it would permit one of its residents to challenge,
in a taxpayer's suit, the constitutionality of a state statute. Frothingham
was concerned with the right of a taxpayer, resident in the United
States, to maintain what in effect was a suit against the United States.
But even before Mrs. Frothingham went to the courts, the Court of
Appeals in New York applied the Frothingham rationale to dismiss
a suit brought by a New York taxpayer who sought to enjoin certain
allegedly illegal acts of New York State election officers. The interest,
reasoned the court in Sc/ieffelin v. Komlort,a which the New York
taxpayer shares in common with other taxpayers is not such a special,
peculiar or personal interest as to entitle him to challenge in court
the legality or constitutionality of an act or an appropriation of a
state officer or a state agency. The Schieffelin rule applies whether the
48. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (state could not
expel elementary school pupil for refusal to salute flag); see discussion in Aid to Educa-
tion-Federal Fashion, p. 512 supra.
49. Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (state could expel college student who
refused to take prescribed military course); see discussion in Aid to Education-Federal
Fashion, p. 511 supra.
50. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (taxpayer had no standing to chal-
lenge federal appropriation); see discussion in Federal Aid to Education-Federal Fashion,
p. 502 supra.
51. Note 50 supra.
52. 212 N.Y. 520, 106 N.E. 675 (1914).
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suit be in the form of an action for an injunction or in the form of
an action for a declaratory judgment. After Buill v. Stichman," decided
in 1948, the rule is to the present issue now more apposite than ever.
For in the Bzdl case the court dismissed the suit of a taxpayer who
sought to raise the very arguments raised here, who sought to enjoin
a state appropriation to Canisius College, a church-related school, on
the ground that the appropriation violated Section 4 of Article XI of
the New York State Constitution.
Thus, in its present context, the constitutional issues implicit in the
scholar-incentive plan would appear to be matters only of legislative
debate and public discussion. Whether the scholar-incentive program
is or is not constitutional is, in all likelihood, a question which will
never be resolved by the courts.
THE STATE CONSTITUTION CONSTRUED
Unfortunately we have had since 1894, the year in which it was
added to the state constitution, but three cases in which the court
of appeals took a direct and lingering look at Section 4. A fourth
case gave it an oblique glance and got a slanted view. The first three
cases were Sargent v. Board of Educ.14 decided in 1904; Judd v. Board
of Edzc.,5 decided in 1938, and 64th St. Residences, Inc. v. City of
New York75 decided in 1958. The fourth case, but second in time, was
People v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co.,"7 decided in 1907.
It is unfortunate also that the cases had little to say about a more
fundamental issue implicit in Section 4, the answer to which is not
only a complete resolution of the present problem but one which is
of cardinal concern to the State of New York and to the people of
the State of New York. The more fundamental issue is whether it
is the policy of the State of New York to subsist on a system of public
higher education alone or whether it is the policy of New York to
promote a system which blends both the public and private in higher
education. Does Section 4, in other words, operate to preclude state
aid to church-related colleges, or is it operative only with respect to
elementary education? For if it operates to preclude state aid to church-
related colleges and if the exclusion of church-related colleges requires
53. 273 App. Div. 311, 73 N.Y.S.2d 279 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 29S N.Y. 516, E0 N.E2d
661 (1948).
54. 177 N.Y. 317, 69 N.E. 722 (1904).
55. 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1933).
56. 4 N.Y.2d 26S, 150 N.E.2d 396, 174 N.Y.S.2d 1, cert. denied, 357 U.S. S07 (1953).
57. 187 N.Y. 142, 79 N.E. S66 (1907).
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the exclusion of all private colleges, we then have a policy in New
York which fosters only public higher education and we have not
only the common school but the common college as well. That issue,
it seems to me, touches upon our way of life and merits our most
serious deliberation. That issue is far more important than the precise
meaning of precise phrases found in various parts of Section 4. The
cases were concerned, however, with the precise phrases and with
formulating a general rule of construction for Section 4.
Judd v. Board of Educ. had the most to say about what Section 4
means and what it meant to accomplish. Judd sought to define the
adverbs "directly" and "indirectly" as they are used in Section 4 and
sought to give us a rule of construction. Judd succeeded in formulating
a rule and, though the result was absurd, the rule itself was a reason-
able one. The court's reasoning also ran around the fundamental and
more important issue: Is Section 4 limited in its application to elementary
and secondary schools? 8 Judd was decided before the exception
clause-"but the legislature may provide for the transportation of
children to or from any school or institution of learning"-became a
part of Section 4.59 Indeed, the frightfulness of the Judd result led
directly and immediately to its repudiation by the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1938 and by the electorate. Judd held, by a four-to-three
decision in the court of appeals reversing the five judges in the ap-
pellate division and the trial judge in the state supreme court,00 that
58. There is nothing in the record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894, at which
art. XI, § 4 was adopted, which throws any particular light-other than is expressed in
the section itself and in the judicial interpretations-on either issue. Nor is there any-
thing of significance in the record of prior or subsequent Constitutional Conventions.
There was no mention of this subject in the Constitutional Conventions of 1821 and 1846.
In the 1867 Convention a petition to prohibit the donation of public moneys to sectarian
institutions was ignored. Journal of the Convention of the State of New York 573 (1867) ;
Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York
2710-15, 2870 (Underhill ed. 1868). In the Convention of 1894 the present section was
reported by the Committee on Education. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Con-
vention 758 passim (Steele rev. 1900). While the language used is quite broad, it is to
be noted that the same committee proposed what is now § 1 of art. XI. Id. at 690.
Whether there was an intended relation between the two sections is not clear from
the records. The relationship as it was found in judicial interpretations is discussed infra,
p. 543. The best that can be said is that § 4 grew out of denominational disputes over
what version of what religion would be taught in public elementary schools. For a
history of the events bearing upon this subject prior to the 1894 Convention, see 3 Lincoln,
The Constitutional History of New York 567 passim (1906).
59. Section 4 was included in Article IX of the Constitution of 1894. When the
exception clause was added in 1938, the section was renumbered and included in Article XI.
60. 253 App. Div. 907, 3 N.Y.S.2d 394 (2d Dep't 1938), affirming 164 Misc. 889, 300 N.Y.
Supp. 1037 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
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the providing of bus transportation to children attending elementary
schools, both public and private, violated Section 4 because it included
children attending church-related elementary schools.,1 We can look
back now and wonder whether the extravagant conclusion at which
the court arrived was not based on something other than logic. What
the majority said and held was that the New York State Constitution
and perhaps, too, the United States Constitution requires us-even as
a safety measure-to deny transportation to a child simply because
he attends a Lutheran school, a Jewish day school or a Catholic
parochial school. Not only a healthy child but a crippled child as
well. " Judd said to the invalid child that he must attend the public
school because our organic law denied him transportation to any
private school which he might otherwise have chosen to attend. It can
with complacency be said that Judd had a dialectic for the judiciary
as well as the electorate to repudiate.
The amendment of the constitution, the addition of the exception
clause, was the popular reply to Judd. The exception clause now tells
us that bus transportation is not the type of aid Section 4 contemplated
when it spoke of direct aid and indirect aid. It is obvious that some
aid is permissible because some aid is inevitable. Some aid is inevitable
so long as we have church-related schools. 3 The question is: when
is aid neither direct or indirect?
Judge Rippey, speaking for the majority in Judd, had a flash of
rhetoric rather than a sense of complete logic when he wrote:
The argument is advanced that furnishing transportation to the pupils of private
or parochial schools is not in aid or support of the schools within the spirit or mean-
ing of our organic law but, rather, is in aid of their pupils. That argument is
utterly without substance. It not only ignores the spirit, purpose and intent of the
constitutional provisions but, as well, their exact wording. . . . There is nothing
ambiguous here. The wording of the mandate is broad. Aid or support to the ,chool
"directly or indirectly" is proscribed. The two words must have been used with some
definite intent and purpose; otherwise why were they used at all? Aid furnished
61. The majority in Judd noted that it could find no case which sustaincd the validity
of bus transportation for children attending church-related schuols. Nine years later the
New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, in Ever-
son v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), affirming 133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A 2d 333 JCt.
Err. & App. 1945), provided just such a case. One wonders now whether, had the Evcrucn
case preceded Judd, the Judd court would have decided as it did.
62. The statute challenged in Judd authorized local school districts to provide free
transportation for the physically handicapped and for children who lived so remote from
the school that they were practically deprived of an education. 273 N.Y. at .03, 15
N.E.2d at 57S.
63. E.g., tax exemption, fire protection, police protection, incorporation.
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"directly" would be that furnished in a direct line, both literally and figuratively, to
the school itself, unmistakably earmarked, and without circumlocution or ambiguity.
Aid furnished "indirectly" clearly embraces any contribution, to whomsoever made,
circuitously, collaterally, disguised, or otherwise not in a straight, open and direct
course for the open and avowed aid of the school, that may be to the benefit of the
institution or promotion of its interests and purposes. How could the people have
expressed their purpose in the fundamental law in more apt, simple and all-em-
bracing language? Free transportation of pupils induces attendance at the school.04
Chief Judge Crane, for himself and two of his colleagues on the
court, dissented.6" He reasoned that since the state had made school
attendance compulsory and since it had approved attendance at private
schools, it was valid for the state to insure attendance. Chief Judge
Crane found no compulsion or encouragement to attend church-related
schools since they had been freely chosen in advance by the child or
parent.
The Judd case had the persuasive force of a judicial precedent. It
left its mark upon the lower courts in New York"' and upon admin-
64. 278 N.Y. at 211, 15 N.E.2d at 582.
65. Id. at 218, 15 N.E.2d at 585.
66. I do not mean to suggest that there were no lower court decisions before Judd
which were not of the same sentiment. We can, in fact, "look before and after and pilne
for what is not." Judd opened the sluice for a flood of lower court decisions which
followed the same course. There were, however, other lower court determinations made
before Judd which carried in the same direction. There were others, including the two
lower court decisions involved in the Judd appeal itself, which ran against the Judd
current. In Stein v. Brown, 125 Misc. 692, 211 N.Y. Supp. 822 (Sup. Ct. 1925), for
example, a case which has been reversed, incidentally, on its holding that the releasing
of children from public school classes for attendance at religious instruction held else-
where than in the public school buildings was unconstitutional, the court said that the
printing of cards by a school district (at a cost of $2.87), which cards were to be com-
pleted by parents to specify the religious instruction which the parents desired the
children to receive, violated § 4. In Smith v. Donahue, 202 App. Div. 656, 195 N.Y. Supp.
715 (3d Dep't 1922), the court held that the free distribution of nonreligious textbooks
to children attending parochial school was an indirect aid to the parochial school and,
therefore, at odds with § 4. Citing Judd, the State Comptroller ruled that a town
board may not open a town hall or town facilities to religious organizations offering
religious instruction even though the facilities are made available to all religious faiths.
5 Op. N.Y. St. Compt. 137 (1949).
On the other hand, the Attorney General has ruled that the rental of noninstructional
facilities of denominational schools by publicly supported youth work projects could not,
as a matter of law, be said to be an aid to the schools themselves. It is not enough to
say or to speculate, the opinion reasoned, that the parochial school would derive benefits
which might be applied for the maintenance of its school facilities. 1950 N.Y. Att'y Gen.
Ann. Rep. 210. The Attorney General ruled, however, that a contract by a state agency to
provide for child care in the denominational school buildings would be a violation of § 4.
1943 N.Y. Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 118. Thus, the mere use of a school building without a
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istrative agencies. Yet I rather suspect that the imprint was left not
because of the rule it announced but because of its failure to follow
the rule it announced. Judd distorted its own rule and it was the Judd
result rather than the Judd rule which roused popular protest. The
rule which Judd formulated was a reasonable one. Judd said, "Aid
furnished 'directly' would be that furnished in a direct line .... Aid
furnished 'indirectly' clearly embraces any contribution, to whomsoever
made, circuitously, collaterally, disguised, or otherwise not in a straight,
open and direct course ... " There is nothing profound in the rule.
Jzdd was talking elementary geometricsY7  It is difficult to understand
how there can be a direct line, a curved line, a looping line or any
kind of an indirect line when there is interposed between the legislative
appropriation and the school itself the individual's expression of a
free will. It would appear that the line is broken by the individual's
provision for religious instruction would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, con-
travene the constitution. To escape constitutional condemnation, apparently only the non-
instructional facilities could be used by public agencies. Reasoning along the same linch, the
State Comptroller ruled that the leasing and operation, under the supervisimn of a Echool
board or a town board, of a parochial school playground for all children during after-
school hours wculd not be, as a matter of law, unconstitutional. S Op. N.Y. St. Compt, 249
(1952).
These various Attorney General and Comptroller decisions are quite accuratdy sum-
marized in a 1957 opinion of the Attorney General wherein it was said that the leasing
of parochial school facilities for recreational purposes is valid "where there would Le no
religious instruction and where the amounts received by these organizations wluld cover
only project operating cost and 'could not conceivably leave them a profit for any ether
purpose.'" 1957 N.Y. Att'y Gen- Ann Rep. 145, 146. This was also the rationale of Ford
v. O'Shea, 136 Misc. 921, 244 N.Y. Supp. 3S (Sup. Ct. 1929), afi'd, 223 App. Div. 772., 239
N.Y. Supp. 877 (1st Dep't 1930), wherein a taxpayer sought to restrain the .New Yerk City
Board of Education from leasing and conducting public school classes in prcmLes tned
by certain churches and by the Franciscan Order. The court said: "The cases cited by the
plaintiff are not authority for the proposition that upon the facts c.leting in this ca~e the
defendant board of education or its superintendent can be said to be violating § 4 of Article
LX of the New York State Constitution. That section prohibits public money to be cd
in aid or maintenance of any school or institution of learning wholly or in part undr the
control or direction of any religious denomination. In the prsent case the facts allkcd in
the complaint, as well as the facts in the affidavits of plaintiff's attorney, fail to Eubstantiate
the charge that the board of education in the city of New York is using or attemptng to
usa any public moneys to aid or maintain the schools of any religious denomination, or that
they are doing anything except providing suitable and proper classrooms for the childr~n
attending public schools to the end that those children may receive all the benefits of the
public school system to which they are entitled." Id. at 923, 244 N.Y. Supp. at 40-41.
67. A straight line is the shortest distance between two points. A curved line, an an-cd
line, or an arced line is not the shortest distance between two points. But they touch both
points. A broken line does not conjoin both points. Thus the geometry of Judd. I cannot
deduce anything more profound from Judge Rippey's rather lofty language.
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exercise of his freedom to choose his school and that there is there-
after neither a direct line nor an indirect line but rather two discon-
nected points.
It may well be that the difficulties attendant upon the lack of trans-
portation in rural areas, or the difficulties with which lack of trans-
portation plagues the parent of the invalid child, would be taken into
account by parents and would influence them in a choice of schools.
But I do not believe that our law is dedicated to the proposition that
we must do all we can to compel the child to attend the public school.
Judd was concerned only with elementary schools but its logic was
tied inextricably to the larger question, the more fundamental ques-
tion relating to the pertinency of Section 4 to institutions of higher
education. The court emphasized that Section 1 of Article XI of the
New York State Constitution requires the legislature to "provide for
the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools,
wherein all the children of this state may be educated." 8 The court
emphasized the use of the adjective, "all." Did it do so with a purpose?
The purpose might well emerge from a comparison of Judd and Sargent
v. Board of Educ 9
The Sargent case sustained an appropriation of public funds to the
St. Mary's Asylum for Orphan Boys and the payment of salaries to
four sisters of a Catholic religious order who were employed by the
Rochester Board of Education to teach the inmates of the asylum.
Instruction in religion was given to the inmates but only in the evening
hours-after completion of secular studies which conformed to the
requirements established by the Board of Education. There was thus
a "direct" grant to the religious institution itself and an "indirect"
grant to the institution by reason of the payment of the salaries of
the teachers. The court reasoned that the orphan asylum was neither
a school nor an institution of learning. The prohibition contained in
Section 4, it was said, was irrelevant. The court also found that there
was a "quid pro quo" for the services rendered to the Board of Edu-
cation by the sectarian institution and it was noted that the Board of
Education has no choice except to provide that the secular education
of the inmates be given at the asylum itself. It appeared that certain
of the inmates were placed there after conviction for crime and that
they could not, so the court found, be released for matriculation at
the public schools. Finally, it was said that Section 4 did not operate
to repeal the system of statutory law which was in effect for the main-
68. 278 N.Y. at 205, 15 N.E.2d at 579.
69. 177 N.Y. 317, 69 N.E. 722 (1904).
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tenance of charities administered by private corporations at the time
the state constitution was adopted.
Sargent sanctioned state aid under circumstances where the state did
not provide for public school education. The legislature, by the Sargent
reasoning, was not compelled by Section 1 of Article XI to provide
common schools for "all" the children of the state. Though Judd and
Sargent are at odds regarding the absoluteness of the adjective in
Section 1, they are in agreement regarding the application or inappli-
cation of Section 4. Judd said that State aid is not available when
Section 1 is operative. Sargent said that state aid is available when
Section 1 is not operative. Section 1 speaks, quite obviously, only of
elementary education. There is no duty imposed upon the legislature
to provide free higher education. ° It would appear, therefore, that
there is a substantial issue as to whether Section 4 has any effect at
all to deny state aid to church-related schools at the college or university
level.
That Section 4 applies in the area of higher education People v.
Brooklyn Cooperage Co.7'1 was ready to assume, although Section 4 was
not in issue there. In issue was Section 8 of Article VII. The court
held that a contract between the state and Cornell University was not
in violation of the latter section. Referring to Section 4, it noted: "It
is argued there would be no meaning in this prohibition of sectarian
appropriation for educational purposes if there were no power to make
such appropriations in aid or maintenance of educational institutions
which are not sectarian, when a consideration for such appropriations
exists in work done by the institutions under contract obligations
assumed by the state."7 And the court seemed to subscribe to this
argument when it said, "It is the policy of the state to foster non-
sectarian education in various directions by selecting some corporation
to act as its subordinate governmental agency, undertaking to render
services to the state in consideration of appropriations made."-
The language is at best ambiguous. The court had before it a
contract74 between the state and Cornell. It expressly noted the fact
70. See College of the City of New York v. Hylan, 205 App. Div. 372, 196 N.Y. Supp.
804 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 236 N.Y. 594, 142 N.E. 297 (1923).
71. 187 N.Y. 142, 79 N.E. 866 (1907).
72. Id. at 157, 79 N.E. at S71.
73. Id. at 159, 79 N.E. at 872.
74. The contract committed Cornell to institute and maintain a dfpartrncnt of foretry
and to develop certain lands as a forest preserve for public use. The lands in quection were
acquired by the state and title conveyed to Cornell to be held by it for thirty years at the
end of which period title was to revert to the state.
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that it was a contract. Since there was a quid pro quo given by Cornell
the transaction did not involve a gift in the first place and references
to Section 8 and Section 4 were, therefore, irrelevant. If what the court
meant to imply was that a gift to a secular college is valid but a gift
to a sectarian college is invalid it may have had some hold on the
legislative intent, but it would be dangerous to universalize any such
rule or generalize it beyond the facts of that particular case. It would
appear that the Brooklyn Cooperage case talked too quickly. Both
Section 8 and Section 4 are stamped with the imprint of the equal
protection clauses of the United States Constitution and the New York
State Constitution, and for that reason I do not believe that we can
formulate a general rule that a general plan of state aid to private
higher education must exclude aid to private higher education which
is church-related. That, it seems to me, is a classification which is
inherently unreasonable and, as such, inconsistent with both the equal
protection and the due process clauses of both the New York State and
United States Constitutions.
Whatever validity, if any, there be in such a classification in the
case of elementary education, it is certainly dissolved at the college
or university level. The contention that religion is not a subject of
study but a matter of indoctrination in church-related schools becomes
arbitrary, indeed, when we include in the latter church-related colleges
and universities. Religion at the college level, like physics, Greek, cal-
culus, chemistry, literature or any of the so-called secular subjects,
is a legitimate and accepted subject of study. Study of the various
religions or religious beliefs of the world or a course in comparative
religions would be and is, I am sure, a standard course at New York
University, Columbia or Cornell as it is at any church-related college.
And it is impossible to suggest that religious indoctrination is present
in a church-related law school or medical school, a school of pharmacy
or a graduate school of analytical science where religion, even as a
proper subject of study, is not taught at all.
I do not mean to suggest that any student seeking a college educa-
tion has a claim upon any part of the educational treasury of the
State of New York. I do not suggest that the state is required to pro-
vide a college education for its citizens or that if the state elects to
provide some higher education without cost to its citizens it is required
to provide any more than public education at public colleges. But I
do say that if the state chooses to aid private education or chooses to
assist its citizens who seek a higher education at its private colleges,
it must do so in a way which is consistent with the equal protection
of its laws and with due process of law. Reduced to its simplest terms,
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this is to say that private nonsectarian colleges and universities are
in no better position, as potential recipients of state assistance, than
private sectarian colleges and universities, and that students attending
the latter can be put in no worse a position than students attending
the former.
It was, I am sure, this consideration of due process of law which
was noted by the court in the 64th St. Residcnces case.75 But it was
not necessary to resolve the issue since the court found that there
was neither direct nor indirect aid given to Fordhami University, the
church-related college, in the first place. At the same time 64th St.
Residences implicitly accepted the rule of the Judd case and necessarily
concluded that it was misapplied in Judd. Consider the facts and the
decision in 64th St. Residences.
The Lincoln Square development or urban renewal plan, a slum
clearance project in New York City, contemplated the creation of a
cultural and educational center within the heart of the city. Fordham
University became interested in acquiring that part of the area which
had, according to a previously approved plan, been allocated for edu-
cational purposes. Each sponsor, or party interested in the project,
including Fordham, agreed to bid at an auction held pursuant to the
New York General Municipal Law7 and, if the successful bidder, to
relocate prior occupants, clear its part of the site and redevelop that
part of the site as required by the plan. Fordham agreed to bid for
the parcel set out "for educational purposes" at a stipulated price
per square foot. The city agreed to acquire that parcel, as well as the
rest of the area, by condemnation and, if Fordham were the successful
bidder, to convey the area to Fordham.
Two facts are paramount. Fordham did receive state or municipal
aid. Its very participation in the redevelopment project was a form
of municipal assistance. Fordham received, in the first instance, the
aid of the city's power of condemnation. It thereby acquired the land
at a price significantly less than that which it would have been required
to pay had it undertaken to acquire the land without the city's assist-
ance. Secondly, the receipt of the benefit was dependent upon an
event which was beyond the control of the city. For, while the parcel
set aside for educational purposes was available by bid to collegiate
institutions only, Fordham had to be the successful bidder. In other
words, the offer of the exercise of the city's power of eminent domain
75. 64th St Residences, Inc. v. City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 26S, 150 NE.Zd 396, 174
N.YS.2d 1, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 907 (195S).
76. N.Y. Mlunic. Law § 72-k.
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was made to all private colleges, but the city could not predetermine
that it would inure to the benefit of a church-related college.
The court found, first, that there was "no substance to the assertion,
on which this whole suit depends, that Fordham is getting a gift, grant
or subsidy of public property."" It did recognize that Fordham was
permitted "to acquire valuable and desirable property at a price which
is probably lower than it would have to pay if it had to negotiate with
all the private owners ."7  And finally the court-cognizant of the very
palpable fact, too frequently ignored, that church-related institutions
have constitutional rights too-added: "Special Term pointed out, prob-
ably correctly, that Fordham would be deprived of constitutional rights
if it alone were excluded from bidding. '79
I would conclude that there are in Sargent illustrations of both direct
and indirect aid-direct aid which took the form of subsidies given
directly to the sectarian institution itself and indirect aid which took
the form of payments to the religious teachers engaged by the sectarian
institution-although neither type of aid was, for other reasons, found
invalid. I would conclude that there now is in Judd itself and in 64th
St. Residences an illustration of a third type of aid which does not
come within the interdict of Section 4. The latter type of aid is neces-
sarily neither direct nor indirect but rather an accidental aid because
there is no connecting line, direct or indirect, straight or circuitous,
between donor and donee, between state and sectarian college. The
same reasoning would apply to the scholar-incentive plan. It is, it
would seem, quite apparent that the scholar-incentive plan puts no
compulsion upon the student to attend any particular college. The in-
centive offered is an incentive to attend some college. So long as that
freedom of choice is recognized and preserved it is difficult to find
any line, direct or indirect, of aid traced from the state to any church-
related college or university. It may be that the tuition grant eventually
reaches the college, but that is only to recognize that "even the weariest
river somewhere reaches the sea." I would conclude, therefore, that
the scholar-incentive plan is not in violation of Section 4, howsoever
the latter section may be construed and applied. But I would also
conclude that this conclusion is rather insignificant when placed beside
the constitutional right of the church-related college recognized in 64th
St. Residences.
Since we cannot, consistently with the requirements of due process
77. 4 N.Y.2d at 276, 150 N.E.2d at 398, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
78. Ibid.
79. Id. at 276, 150 N.E.2d 399, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
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of law, exclude church-related colleges from any plan of state aid for
private colleges, we are left with a choice between a kind of Herodian
enforcement of Section 4, enforcement in such a way as necessarily to
decree a pogrom of all state assistance for all private colleges, whether
or not church-related, or, with better sense, the alternative conclusion
that Section 4 does not apply in the case of higher education.
CONCLUSION
In its editorials attacking the scholar-incentive plan, the Nctw York
Tizes"" created two assumptions: first, that the plan was deliberately
designed to aid church-related colleges and, second, that aid to church-
related colleges is unconstitutional. The first assumption is manifestly
fragile. The second is reckless and frightening. For the terminal point
of the second assumption is the denial of assistance to all private
colleges. This process of proceeding by assumption beclouds what
is not only a constitutional issue of great consequence but an issue
of policy of paramount concern for the State of New York and, per-
haps, for the Nation. The Times would necessarily ordain that only
public higher education in New York receive state assistance. It would
necessarily constitutionalize the public colleges of New York. That
is a result so diametrically opposed to the history and policy of higher
education in New York that I cannot conceive that it could ever have
been in the contemplation of the Constitutional Convention of 1894.
I cannot conceive that Section 4 was ever intended to apply in the
context of the scholar-incentive plan or of any plan of aid for the
colleges themselves.
Judd v. Board of Educ. crystallized the reasoning that there could be
no aid for church-related elementary schools because the legislature
was required to maintain a system of common schools for the educa-
tion of all the children of the state. Judd quite obviously talked only
of elementary education.
Under this provision [Section 1], the schools provided must be sufficiently numerous
so that all the children of the State may receive their education, vwhatever may be
their race, creed, color, or condition. Private, denominational and sectarian schools,
and schools or institutions of learning in which denominational tenets or doctrines
are taught or those wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious
denomination are no part of and are not vithin that system.8 '
Quite obviously the legislature does not now feel nor has it ever felt
compelled to provide public higher education for all the children of New
So. Notes 29, 37 supra.
81. 278 N.Y. at 205, 15 N.E.2d at 579. The italics are the court's.
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York. Historically, traditionally, private colleges have been and are to-
day within the system of higher education in New York. "Thus common
school education within the State," Judd said further, "came exclusively
under public control and has since so remained."82 Quite obviously high-
er education for all the citizens of New York has never come exclusively
under public control.
Judd spoke of the severance of sectarian schools and "the public
common schools" and it noted that "while education is compulsory
in this State between certain ages, the State has no desire to and
could not if it so wished compel children to attend the free public
common schools when their parents desire to send them to parochial
schools." 3 Thus the common school is the school which the legisla-
ture is required to provide to satisfy the compulsory education laws
of the state. This includes no more than elementary and secondary
education. There is nothing in Judd to suggest that the state is for-
bidden to foster a blended system of public and private higher educa-
tion. There is much in Judd which suggests the contrary.
The Heald Committee recognized the historic policy of fusion of
public and private in higher education. It specifically reported that
"it has been the practice in New York State to permit private colleges and
universities to enroll all the students they could handle, and to limit
the expansion of public institutions to the balance.18 4 The Heald Report
recognized that "all colleges and universities incorporated in the State,
both public and private, are 'members' of the University of the State
of New York."85 It called private colleges and universities the "bul-
wark of higher education in New York,''80 recognized that "private
institutions of higher learning have important and unique functions to
perform,"8 " that they "give American education a diversity and scope
not possible in tax-supported institutions alone, and they have an
opportunity to emphasize, if they wish, individualistic patterns of
thought, courses of social action, or political or religious activity." 8
And the report concluded that topic with the note that in New York
82. 278 N.Y. at 207, 15 N.E.2d at 580. The italics are the court's.
83. 278 N.Y. at 211, 15 N.E.2d at 582. (Emphasis added.)
84. Committee on Higher Education, Meeting the Increased Demand for Higher Edu-
cation in New York State: A Report to the Governor and the Board of Regents 4 (1960).
85. Id. at 16. The italics are the Committee's. There are 126 private colleges and uni-
versities in New York State. Id. at 17.
86. Id. at 24.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
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State "private colleges and universities have performed this function
with great competency in the past." '
The Governor, in his special message to the legislature, re-emphasized
the history which the Heald Report had noted, and the Governor added,
"These institutions, public and private, are the present strength of
higher education in New York."' Indeed, the whole history of Regents
scholarships"' shows a medley of state concern for private higher
education and state concern for the freedom of the scholar to attend
the college or the university of his choice. The Governor simply pro-
posed to make available to the needy student what the state already
made available to the gifted scholar because, the Governor said, "the
future progress of New York . . . . relies importantly upon educational
opportunity for all who have the desire and the capacity to make use
of it."92
Surely then it has been the historical practice and the established
policy of New York to provide in the area of higher education a mi:x-
ture of public and private. It is not the policy or the plan of the
state to create now a system which will lead to public higher education
for all its citizens. If the Heald auguries are correct, that may well
be our destination unless the state does provide aid for private colleges
and universities. If that is where the river runs, it is tragic, indeed.
Years ago mere literacy was the norm of a required education. In
years to come broadening vistas of human knowledge may require
a compulsory higher education system. Even if that system be a sys-
tem of exclusively public education, I do suppose Columbia and Ford-
ham and Cornell will survive, though with greater financial difficulty.
But their influence will certainly be less, and we might, indeed, eventually
lose what Dr. Heald valued as their "individualistic patterns of
thought."93 Thus those who, like the Times, would in their assump-
tions pile Pelion on Ossa to strike at the gods are striking at something
which may be destructive of our democratic way of life. For they are
striking at something destructive of all private higher education.
In Sparta long ago the child was said to belong absolutely to the
state. At the age of seven he was removed from the home to be trained
in state schools under state officers. Sparta knew nothing of private
education. The state school education continued until the youth reached
S9. Ibid.
90. Rockefeller, Increased Opportunities For Higher Education, N.Y. Lcgisative Doc.
No. 9, at 6 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
91. See note 14 supra.
92. Rockefeller, op. cit. supra note 90, at 5.
93. Committee on Higher Education, op. cit. supra note 84, at 24.
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the age of twenty. He was trained in a rigid military tradition. The
Spartan discipline produced great soldiers and deeds of matchless brav-
ery. But the Spartan system is foreign to our civilization-except per-
haps in Russia and Communist China today. To meet the challenge
of the Soviet space explorations I do not think we must now imitate
their educational system or their way of life. It is well to remember
that Leonidas was history's singular example of Spartan bravery but
that, however courageous and skilled in warfare he may have been,
Leonidas perished in the pass at Thermopylae. It was, in the end, an
Athenian, Themistocles, who rallied the fleet at Salamis and sent Xerxes
back to Persia. Sparta itself served, after all, only as a garrison for
the rest of Greece. Sparta itself left to the world no literature, no
philosophy, no culture, because it had none to leave. The value of
Sparta to the world lay in the fact that it helped save something
better than itself. We have a primary duty to the world to save the
something better which is in ourselves.
